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Public Accounts Committees in the Pacific Region 
 
Introduction 
In spite of the fact that the PACs in the Pacific region operate in very small jurisdictions, they have 
been the subject of several studies.  
There have been, in fact, at least two waves of studies of PACs in the Pacific Region. The first wave 
of studies was produced in the mid-1980s, while the second wave was produced in the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century.  
All these studies lamented that the PACs (and legislatures) in the region were underperforming, 
though they invoked different reasons to explain why the performance of PACs (and legislatures) 
was suboptimal. For instance, studies from the first wave claimed that PACs could not work 
because of a ‘genetic’ reason: they were not local solutions to local problems, they were designed to 
operate in very different settings, were not ‘owned’ by the stakeholders and, as a result, could not 
possibly work.  
Studies from the second wave argued instead that the performance of PACs in the Pacific region 
was (negatively) affected by a variety of reasons. For instance Rawlings argued that PAC 
performance was detrimentally affected by what Stapenhurst (2011) defines as the external factors 
and facilitating conditions—namely the presence of other oversight bodies, the nature of the 
relationship between the PAC and the other oversight institutions, the availability and the quality of 
staff and the access to information. By contrast, Pelizzo (2010) found that the performance of PACs 
in the Pacific region was detrimentally affected by the range of formal powers at their disposal. 
While it has been argued that the suboptimal performance of PACs may in general be ascribed to 
absence of facilitating conditions (such as the absence of qualified staff), to the absence of external 
factors (such an effective relationship with the AG), or to the range of powers at the disposal of 
PACs, it is however important to keep in mind that there is considerable variation in the region in 
terms of performance, oversight capacity or the range of powers and organizational characteristics.
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In this chapter we review each of these aspects and then we try formulate some conclusions as to 
what affects the performance of PACs in the Pacific region. In doing so we will employ the data 
collected by CPA in collaboration with WBI in 2009 when the two organizations teamed up to draft 
and administer a survey on PACs in several Pacific Island nations. 
Specifically,  CPA and WBI gathered information from 8 PACs from the Pacific region: 
Bougainville, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon islands, Vanuatu and Tuvalu. The 
survey asked respondents to answer 87 questions on the power and responsibilities, membership 
and leadership, processes and working practices, and access to resources and support. By re-
analyzing some of the data that have been analyzed before and the wealth of the survey datathat 
                                                          
1
 The PEFA reports produced for the countries in the Pacific region show not only considerable variation across 
countries but also across time. For instance, the legislative scrutiny of the external audit reports was given a score of A 
in Samoa in 2006, of C+ in the Solomon islands in 2008, of D in Vanuatu in 2006 and of D+ for Samoa in 2010.. See 
Ecorys (2006, 2008) and Linpico (2006). 
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were neglected by previous analyses, we believe that we will be able to provide a finer 
understanding of the organization, the mandate, the responsibilities, the functioning and the overall 
performance PACs from the Pacific region. 
The literature on public accounts committees 
 
The publication of the study of McGee (2002) ignited a new wave of studies on public accounts 
committees. Some studies were case studies, some were regional comparative analyses, while other 
covered the Commonwealth. Some studies relied on survey data, other relied on evidence generated 
by field work, but all of them sought to identify the conditions that make PAC work effectively. 
There are three basic answers as to what make PAC work effectively. A stream of research, that 
originates with McGee, holds the view that the success of PAC depends on their organizational 
characteristics. Specifically, McGee (2002) suggested that the size of a PAC, the partisan affiliation 
of the PAC Chairperson and the size of the staff at the disposal of a PAC are largely responsible for 
its success. Building on the work by McGee (2002), Pelizzo (2011) suggested that the partisan 
composition of the PAC membership, that is whether opposition forces are adequately represented 
in the committee, is very important. 
A second stream of research has suggested instead that the success of PACs depends on institutional 
features such as the way in which PAC are institutionalized (created) and the range of powers at 
their disposal.  
While a third stream of research (McGee, 2002; Stapenhurst et al.,2005) suggested the success of 
PAC depends on the way PAC members act and interact with one another. 
Do these organizational, institutional and behavioral approaches provide us with a proper 
framework to understand the functioning of PACs in the Pacific region? Before we proceed to 
answer this question, we will discuss the organization and institutional characteristics of PACs in 
the Pacific  and then we will show which of them provide the best explanation for how these 
committees work in the region. 
 
The organizational characteristics of PACs 
 
With regard to the organizational characteristics of the PACs, the Pacific region displays 
considerable variation. McGee (2002) said three were important organizational features are the size 
of the committee, the partisan affiliation of the Chairperson and the size of the staff. To this list 
Pelizzo (2011) added a fourth organization feature, that is the proportion of opposition memebrs 
serving in the committee.  
Let’s review each of these features. With regard to size, the data gathered by CPA and WBI show 
that it varies from a minimum of 3 MPs in Kiribati and Tuvalu to a maximum of 14 MPs in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), with a mean of 7.12 MPs per PAC. In the majority of cases MPs serving on a 
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PAC do not serve on other committees, with exceptions of PNG and Tuvalu (while Bougainville 
did not provide any evidence in this respect).  
In the Pacific region, the data at our disposal reveal that there is limited variation in how well 
opposition forces are represented on the PAC itself. In fact while two legislatures (Fiji, Solomon 
Islands) reported that the opposition controls 33 per cent of the seats in the PAC, two legislatures 
(Samoa, Vanuatu) reported that the opposition controls 43 per cent of the seats, while Bougainville, 
Kiribati, PNG and Tuvalu did not provide any indication of whether and how the opposition is 
represented on the PAC. 
While opposition forces control, on average, only 41.2 per cent of the seats in Pacific PAC, they 
control 50 per cent of the PAC Chairpersons. In fact, while in Bougainville, Kiribati, PNG and 
Samoa the PAC is chaired by a government member, in the remaining cases (Fiji, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu) the PAC is chaired by an opposition member.
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Since the literature has long stressed that one of the most important organizational features of a 
PAC are its size, the partisan affiliation of the Chairperson and the size of the staff, table 1 presents 
some information also with regard to whether and how well PACs are staffed in the region. In doing 
so, we provide evidence not only with regard to the total staff at the disposal of the committee but 
also with regard to the dedicated staff at the disposal of the committee.
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 In terms of dedicated staff, 
the data indicate that their number varies from a minimum of 0 in Kiribati and Tuvalu to a 
maximum of 4 in Samoa. In terms of total staff, this value ranges from a minimum of 2 staffers in 
Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu to a maximum of 6 in PNG. Further details are presented in table 1. 
Table 1. Organizational characteristics of PACs 
country Size of the 
PAC 
Can members 
serve on 
other 
committees? 
Percentage 
of 
opposition 
members 
Chairperson 
is an 
opposition 
MP 
Dedicated 
staff 
Total staff 
Bougainville 5 n.a. 0 No 2 4 
Fiji 12 No 36.4 Yes * * 
Kiribati 3 No 33 No 0 2 
PNG 14 Yes n.a. No 3 6 
Samoa 7 No 43 No 4 4 
Solomon 6 No 33 Yes 1 6 
Vanuatu 7 No 43 Yes 1 2 
Tuvalu 3 Yes 100 Yes 0 2 
average 7.125  41.2 50 1.57 3.71 
Legend: n.a. =not answered; * = Vanuatu responded that all the parliamentary staff assist all 
committees including the PAC. 
 
                                                          
2
 In Samoa, the Chair is not simply a member of the government party, he is actually the Associate Minister for the 
Ministry of the Prime Minister. 
3
 Total staff refers not to the number of dedicated staff, staff shared with other committees, staff provided by 
government departments, staff provided by the AG and staff provided by other institutional sources. 
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Powers, responsibility and functions of the PAC in the pacific region 
The questionnaire designed by CAP and WBI asked respondents to provide information with regard 
to the powers the responsibilities, the functions and the mandate of PACs in the region. The 
evidence generated in these respects by the survey administered by CPA and WBI is important for 
two reasons. The first is that it enables us to map the capacity of PACs in several jurisdictions, 
assess strengths and weaknesses, detect variation in the region. The second is that several of the 
studies inspired by the work of McGee, and the work of McGee itself, reported a view that was 
nearly unanimously shared by PAC chairpersons in the Commonwealth, namely that a broad 
mandate was a necessary and essential condition for the successful performance of a PAC. Hence, 
the survey data generated by CPA and WBI allow us to assess the breadth of the mandate that PACs 
have in the region and to test whether PAC activity and performance in the Pacific region is in fat 
related to the range of powers, responsibilities and functions that PACs have in the region or not. 
Before we proceed any further in describing the data, it is worth recalling that that the powers, 
responsibilities and functions were grouped into three distinct sets of powers dealing respectively 
with the right of access, the accounts and operations and the relations with the AG or other SAI. 
Right of access 
As some of the essays included in this collection make it clear one of the problems that PAC are or 
may be confronted with it, is represented by the possible limitations or constraints imposed on the 
access rights enjoyed by PAC. And, since access rights are a significant component of the powers of 
a PAC and since the scope of powers has traditionally been regarded as a significant determinant of 
PACs’ ability to effectively perform their oversight function, constraints of the right of access may 
be viewed as an obstacle to effective PAC performance as the case of the British Isles seems to 
suggest. 
But what is the capacity of Pacific PACs in terms of right of access? Is their right of access subject 
to strict limits an restrictions? And do these restrictions affect PAC performance in the region? 
The right of access refers to the number and type of government organizations or public entities to 
which PACs have either unconditional, conditional or no access. The survey administered by CPA 
and WBI asked respondents to indicate whether they had unconditional, conditional or no acess to 
the following entities: Government agencies within the finance portfolio, Government agencies 
outside the finance portfolio, Statutory authorities, Government owned corporations, Local 
government authorities, Parliament (and its expenditures), Parliamentarians’ expenditures (eg. 
Staff), Government service providers, Government funded non-government organizations. The data 
concerning the right of access in the Pacific are displayed in Table 2. 
 
The data presented in table 2 make it quite clear that PACs in the Pacific have a fairly unconstrained 
right of access. They have access to virtually all the entities included in questionnaire and their 
access is generally unconditional. Not surprisingly, Jacobs, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2013) reported 
that the PAC from the Pacific region have a more unconstrained right of access than their 
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counterparts in the British isles, South East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, the Caribbean and 
Africa. 
 
Table 2. Right of access in the Pacific 
 Bougainville Fiji Kiribati PNG Samoa Solomon Vanuatu Tuvalu 
Government 
agencies within the 
finance portfolio 
unconditional uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
Unconditi
onal 
Government 
agencies outside the 
finance portfolio 
unconditional uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
Unconditi
onal 
Statutory authorities NO uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
Unconditi
onal 
Government owned 
corporations 
NO uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal  
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
Unconditi
onal 
Local government 
authorities 
unconditional uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
Unconditi
nal 
Parliament (and its 
expenditures) 
conditional uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
NO 
Parliamentarians’ 
expenditures (eg. 
Staff) 
unconditional uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditi
onal 
NO 
Government service 
providers 
unconditional NO NO conditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
- Unconditi
onal 
Government funded 
non-government 
organizations 
conditional uncondi
tional 
NO conditio
nal 
uncondi
tional 
unconditio
nal 
NO unconditi
onal 
 
All the PACs from the Pacific region have an unconditional access to government agencies within 
and outside the finance portfolio and local government authorities; 87.5 per cent of the PACs (all 
the PACs except the one in Bougainville) have unconditional right to access to statutory authorities 
and government corporation. Furtehrmore 87.5 per cent of the PACs in the Pacific (which means all 
of them except Tuvalu) have an unconditional right of access to Parliamentarians’ expenditures, 
whereas only 75 per cent of the PACs in the region have an unconditional right to access to 
Parliaments expenditures. The PAC in Tuvalu does not have this right and Bouaginville enjoys it 
conditionally. With regard to the right of access to government funded NGOs, PACs in the Pacific 
enjoy this right unconditionally in 50 per cent of the cases (Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Island and 
Tuvalu), 25 per cent of them enjoy it conditionally (Bougainville, PNG) and 25 per cent of them 
lack it altogether (Kiribati, Vanuatu). 
 
Accounts and Operations 
 
The evidence presented in this section concerns the activities performed by a Pac, namely whether it 
can examine accounts; consider budget estimates; assess the efficiency, economy and effectiveness 
of a given policy; the efficiency and the economy of policy implementation, the effectiveness of 
policy implementation, and whether it has the power to undertake self-initiated inquiries. PACs can 
enjoy these powers unconditionally, conditionally or not at all. The evidence is presented in Table 
3. 
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Table 3. Accounts and Operations 
 Bougain. Fiji Kiribati PNG Samoa Solomon  
Islands 
Vanuatu Tuvalu 
Examination of 
accounts and 
financial affairs 
unconditi
onal 
uncond
itional 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
Consideration 
of budget 
estimates (other 
than Audit 
Office) 
NO NO NO NO unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
NO 
Efficiency, 
economy and 
effectiveness of 
government 
policy 
unconditi
onal 
NO NO unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
NO - unconditio
nal 
Efficiency and 
economy of 
policy 
implementation 
(value for 
money) 
unconditi
onal 
uncond
itional 
NO unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
NO - unconditio
nal 
Effectiveness of 
government 
implementation 
(delivery of 
outcomes) 
unconditi
onal 
NO unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
unconditio
nal 
NO - unconditio
nal 
Undertake self-
initiated 
inquiries 
unconditi
onal 
- NO unconditio
nal 
NO NO NO unconditio
nal 
 
 
The data presented in Table 3 suggest some considerations. The first is that while PACs in the 
Pacific region are very well endowed in terms of rights of access, they are considerable less so in 
terms of their ability to oversee accounts and operations. In fact, while all the PACs in the region 
unconditionally enjoyed several rights to access, the only power that all Pacific PACs enjoy 
unconditionally is that of examining accounts and financial affairs. All the other powers are enjoyed 
unconditionally by fewer PACs. Only 37.5 per cent of the PAC examine budget estimates, 42.8 per 
cent of them have the right to undertake self-initiated inquiries, 57.1 per cent of them oversee the 
efficiency economy and effectiveness of government policy 71.4 per cent of them have the power to 
assess value for money and delivery of outcomes. In other words, except for the power to oversee 
accounts and financial affairs, all the other powers are enjoyed from a minimum of a little more 
than one-third of the PACs to a maximum of slightly less than three-quarters of the PACs in the 
region. 
The second consideration is that while PACs in the Pacific outperform the PACs of all other 
regions, except South Asia, in terms of right of access, they are among the weakest in terms of their 
power to oversee accounts and operations. In fact, as Jacobs, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2013) have 
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shown in their work, the Pacific PACs along with Caribbean are outperformed by the PACs from all 
the other regions in terms of their ability to oversee accounts and operations. 
The third consideration is that these data do not simply indicate an institutional weakness of PACs 
in the region, but they also show that these PACs depart in significant ways from the archetypical 
PAC.  
Yamamoto (2007) suggested that PACs are only found in Westminster countries, that they are a 
reactive institutions in the sense that they act upon and therefore react to reports brought to their 
attention by  the SAI/AG, that they lack any ability to initiate inquiries or to instruct the AG to 
conduct some inquiries and, last but not least, that they oversee the budget ex post but not ex ante. 
They oversee whether money is spent for the purposes for which it had been appropriated, but they 
are not involved or consulted in the drafting of the budget and that they do not assess budget 
estimates.  
PACs in the Pacific region depart in significant ways from the archetype described by Yamamoto: 
nearly 38 per cent of them look at budget estimates and nearly 43 per cent of them have the power 
to launch their own inquiries: they can exercise ex ante oversight and can initiate the inquiry 
process. 
 
Relationship with the AG 
The third set of powers concerns PACs’ ability to examine various types of Auditor Generals’ 
reports or to bring matters to the attention of the Auditor General. The three powers that belong to 
this category are the power to perform an examination of Auditor General compliance reports, an 
examination of Auditor General Performance reports and, finally, the power to refer matters to the 
Auditor General for investigation. PACs can enjoy each of these powers unconditionally, 
conditionally or may not enjoy it at all. 
 
Tab.4. AG Reports 
 Examination of AG 
compliance report 
Examination of AG 
performance report 
Power to refer 
matters to the AG 
bougainville NO NO conditionally 
fiji unconditionally NO unconditionally 
kiribati unconditionally NO unconditionally 
png unconditionally unconditionally unconditionally 
samoa NO NO NO 
solomon isl. unconditionally unconditionally unconditionally 
vanuatu unconditionally unconditionally unconditionally 
tuvalu unconditionally unconditionally unconditionally 
 
In four (PNG, Solomon islands, Vanuatu, Tuvalu) of the eight cases, the PACs unconditionally 
enjoy these three power. In two cases (Fiji, Kiribati) the PACs unconditionally enjoys two powers 
(to examine the compliance reports and to refer matters). In one case (Bougainville) the PACs lacks 
the power to examine both the compliance and the performance reports drafted by the AG, while it 
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enjoys conditionally the power to refer matters to the AG. In one case (Samoa), the PAC lacks all of 
these powers. 
The evidence presented so far can be used to measure the range or amount of formal powers at the 
disposal of PACs. Specifically we assign a score of 1, 0.5 and 0 to PAC that respectively enjoy a 
power unconditionally, conditionally or not at all. By adding the score that a PAC receives for each 
of the powers, we can construct an additive scale. Since the maximum score that a PAC may 
receive for right of access, accounts and operations and AG reports is respectively 9, 6 and 3, it is 
clear that the maximum value that the formal power index may take is 9+6+3=18. PACs in the 
pacific region score from a minimum of 11 in Kiribati to a maximum of 16 in PNG. 
PAC Activity 
The survey questionnaire administered by CPA and WBI was designed to gather information on the 
level, the amount and the type of activities performed by PACs in the Pacific region. 
PACs were asked to indicate how many meetings and hearings had held in each of the previous 
three years, how many inquiries they had been able to complete, how many reports had been able to 
release. Information was also gathered with the regard to the sources of PAC activity. 
With regard to the number of meetings held there is a considerable variation. Vanuatu reported 
holding 0 (zero) meetings in 2006-07 and in 2007-2008, while Fiji reported holding 87 meetings in 
2005-06, 41 in 2006-07, and daily meetings in 2007-08. If instead of looking at yearly values, we 
consider yearly averages, the data display considerable variation. The average number of meetings 
varies from a minimum of 0.3 meetings in Vanuatu to more than 30 meetings a year in Samoa and 
to the nearly 83 meetings held on average in the Fiji. 
Interestingly, the responses provided by the Pacific PACs display two main trends. In some 
countries (PNG, Solomon) the number of meetings held by the PAC increased every year, in some 
countries it first declined and then bounced back higher (Fiji, Samoa), while in a third group of 
countries after the first year the number of meetings held remained constant (Vanuatu, Tuvalu). 
With regard to the number of meetings, several PACs (Bougainville, Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu) did 
not provide any evidence. The remaining four did provide some evidence that suggests great 
variation and differet temporal trends. In terms of number of hearings, the average varies from a 
minimum of 0 (zero) in Vanuatu to a maximum of 26.3 in Samoa, whereas the PAC holds 
respectively 21.6 and 7.6 annual hearings in, respectively, PNG and Solomon Islands. The data 
reported in Figure 1 make it clear that there is a very strong relationship between the average 
number of meetings held and the average number of hearings held. PAC that hold more meetings, 
also hold more hearings and viceversa. 
In terms of temporal trends, the data display four different patterns: there are stable in one case 
(Vanuatu), they increase first and then decline later in another case (Solomon), they decline and 
then bounce back higher in a third case (Samoa) while they increase constantly every year in the 
fourth case (PNG). 
Figure 1 Scatterplot. Number of meetings and hearings 
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 With regard to the number of inquiries completed by the PAC, the data suggest that there is 
considerable variation in the region. On average the number of completed inquiries varies from a 
minimum of 0 (zero) in Vanuatu to a maximum of 22.6 in PNG. 
The survey data collected by CPA in collaboration with WBI also shed some light on the sources of 
PAC activity. Matters referred by the Auditor General were responsible for generating 57.5 per cent 
of the inquiries and reports. No PAC reported receiving work from individual members, but 32.5 
per cent of the PACs reported to have received work from Parliament, 1.25 per cent of them 
reported to have received work from a Minister and 8.75 per cent of the PACs indicated that self-
initiated inquires had been responsible for PAC activity. 
These aggregate data conceal however the variation in the importance of the sources of PAC work 
and activity. For instance the Auditor General is responsible for all the work carried out by the PAC 
in Tuvalu, for 70 per cent of the work carried out by the PAC in the Solomon Islands, for 60 per 
cent of the work carried in PNG and for 0 per cent of the PAC work in Samoa. Parliament is 
responsible for all the PAC work in Samoa, for none of the PAC work in Tuvalu, for 20 per cent of 
the work in the Solomon Islands and for 10 per cent of the PAC work in PNG. Ministers are 
responsible for 5 per cent of the PAC work in PNG, but for no PAC work anywhere else in the 
region, whereas self-initiated inquiries account for 10 per cent of the work in Solomon islands and 
for 25 per cent of the PAC work in PNG. 
Most of the indicators of PAC activity employed here are not affected either by the range of the 
powers at the disposal of the committee or by the organizational characteristics. While most 
measures of activity are not affected by most measures of organizational capacity or institutional 
power, we do find some rather strong relationship. For instance, the data presented in figure 1 make 
it clear that, as far as the Pacific region is concerned, countries where PACs had a broader right of 
access, PACs produced more reports. 
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Figure 1. Right of access and number of reports 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Opposition chair and number of reports 
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Figure 2. Opposition chair and number of hearings 
 
 
Figure 4. Size and number of reports 
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PAC performance seems to be linked to the organizational characteristics of the PACs themselves, 
though some of the evidence generated by analyzing the data at our disposal is somewhat at odds 
with claims previously advance in the literature. 
First of all, the number of the dedicated stuff is not significantly related to any of our measures of 
PAC activity.  
Second, the proportion of opposition MPs serving on the PAC is strongly related, though not always 
significantly, related to number of inquiries, number of reports and number of hearings. 
Specifically, where the opposition is better represented, the PAC is more active in terms of herarigs, 
inquiries and reports. Hence , while this conclusion may not hold elsewhere, in the Pacific it is clear 
that one way to improve the output of PACs is to ensure good representation of opposition forces on 
the committee. 
Third, while the size of the committee seems to have little to no impact on the other measures of 
activity, it has a strong, negative impact on the number of reports. Visual inspection of figure 4 
makes it clear that, as the size of a PAC increases in the Pacific region, the number of reports 
produced by the PAC declines. Hence, while this conclusion may not hold in other region, it is clear 
that the productivity of PACs in the Pacific region could be boosted by downsizing the committees.  
Fourth, the presence of an opposition chair is negatively related to all the indicators of activity. As 
figures 2 and 3 illustrate, the presence of an opposition chair is associated with fewer committee 
meetings, fewer inquiries and fewer reports. 
The data analyzed here suggest quite clearly what the way forward should be. If  the productivity of 
PACs in the Pacific region is to be enhanced, it is better to have smaller committees, with a larger 
proportion of opposition member and with government chairpersons than having, as previous 
studies instead claimed bigger committees (McGee, 2002) and opposition chairpersons (McGee, 
2002). 
From Activity to Performance 
Our discussion so far has suggested that the powers at the disposal of a PAC along with some of the 
organizational characteristics of the PACs are clearly associated with the output of the level of 
activity of these committees. And one could even be inclined to argue that what we are witnessing 
is not so much an association or a correlation, but a clear causal link. This means that it is not by 
accident that PACs with more opposition members perform more activities than those PACs that 
have fewer opposition members, but it is precisely because there opposition forces are better 
represented that the PAC does more. 
One question that has however perplexed scholars, legislative studies specialists and practitioners is 
whether it is appropriate to use levels of output (activity) as proxies for the successfulness in 
delivering the outcomes (performance).  
Some studies assumed that it was appropriate to do so, other studies decided to inquire as to 
whether the levels of output (meetings, hearings) were actually related to frequency with which 
PACs were able to achieve policy relevant results (Pelizzo, 2011), while other studies (Bianchi, 
2012) equated the success of PACs with their ability to save public money. 
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Here we adopt a slightly different approach to inquire into the nature of the relationship between 
PAC activity and performance. PEFA, as we noted above, has conducted an assessment exercise on 
the expenditures and financial accountability of several countries including some Pacific island 
nations. In one of the sections of the PEFA assessment reports, the evaluators were asked to 
evaluate the oversight performance and capacity of oversight committees. The reports generated for 
three (Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu) of the eight Pacific island nation included in the present 
study, show that there is a clear, direct, positive correspondence between the amount of activities 
performed by the PACs and the assessment of their performance. In other words, the PACs that do 
more (as indicated by our measures of activity ), are the ones that PEFA regarded as better 
performing. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the present chapter was very straightforward. The paper initially provided some 
descriptive information about the organization, the powers, the functions and the responsibilities of 
PACs in the Pacific region. The paper also provided some information on the type and amount of 
activity performed by PACs in the region. 
Building on this descriptive information, the chapter presented the results of two sets of analyses. 
The first set of analyses attempted to assess the impact of organizational characteristics, such as the 
size of the committee, the size of the staff at the disposal of the committee, the presence of an 
opposition chairperson and the proportion of opposition MPs on the committee, on the amounts of 
activities performed by the committee. The second set of analyses attempted to assess the impact of 
the range of powers at the disposal of a PAC on its performance. 
By doing so we found that broader rights of access, smaller committee size, better representation of 
opposition forces on the committee and government chairpersons are associated with higher levels 
of activity, while all the other powers and organizational characteristics have no impact on the level 
of committee activity. 
On the basis of this evidence, we formulated some suggestions as to how the level of PAC activity 
could be stimulated in the Pacific region. We also showed why stimulating activity is important. By 
comparing the data at our disposal with the data generated by PEFA it becomes immediately 
apparent that where committee do more (as per our measures) it is where they perform better (as per 
PEFA measures) and viceversa. This means that by following the recommendations formulated 
here, PACs in the Pacific will do more and will work better, they will be more active and more 
effective. 
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